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Mechanical Testimony
David J. Portmann*
T HIS ARTICLE DEALS with the familiar conflict of people versus ma-
chines, in considering the legal question of whether a machine can
testify against an accused. It is a generally accepted principle that a
person's physical appearance and characteristics are admissible in court
as evidence for the purpose of identification. There is no general rule,
however, which specifies what factors constitute a person's physical
characteristics, and a problem arises when the courts must determine
whether an accused's self-incrimination privilege is being abridged.
Self-Incrimination Privilege'
The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution forbids a
state's violation of the privilege against self-incrimination established
in the fifth amendment. Thus, a person has the right to remain silent
in either a state or federal court unless, in the unfettered exercise of his
own will, he chooses to speak. Further, he shall suffer no penalty or
prejudice for any silence. 2 This has been interpreted to mean that any
witness is vested with the privilege against self-incrimination in a hear-
ing where testimony is taken, although the provision relates to criminal
cases only.3 In a criminal proceeding an accused person may not be
compelled to testify as a witness by the state, and although he may tes-
tify on his own behalf, his refusal to testify does not create any pre-
sumption against him. Introduction of the fact that the accused failed
to so testify is error.4 The privilege protects the privacy of the accused
by shielding him from judicial inquisition, removing the pressure to com-
mit perjury, lessening the disadvantages of a timid or nervous person,
and necessitating a more thorough investigation.5 Thus, the innocent
and the guilty are equally protected.
The Non-Testimonial Privilege
This privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable in two
situations-when the evidence is considered to be non-testimonial and
when the suspect or accused voluntarily testifies after he has been ad-
* B.A., DePauw Univ.; Trust Administrator, Central National Bank of Cleveland;
Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 For a history of the privilege against self-incrimination in England and America,
see Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 485 (1956-57).
2 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964).
3 W. Richardson, Evidence, 542 (9th ed. 1964).
4 People v. Leavitt, 301 N.Y. 113, 92 N.E. 2d 915 (1950).
5 Supra note 3, at 192-93.
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vised of his right to remain silent." The privilege, therefore, applies only
to conduct which the accused can control as a means of conveying ideas
or thoughts. It is important to note that it is not merely all conduct that
he can control, but rather it is control of words or acts which by their
own meaning will tend to implicate or incriminate the accused. Conduct
which the accused cannot so control, regardless of when or how com-
pelled, does not violate the privilege.7 The object of the privilege, in
other words, is to prevent the employment of legal process to withdraw
from the accused's own lips an admission of his guilt which would then
take the place of other evidence.8 It is, therefore, not all compulsion that
is protected by the privilege but merely testimonial compulsion. Further,
where the evidence was voluntarily given, or given by the stipulation of
the parties, it is admissible as evidence providing it is relevant and other-
wise competent.
Non-Testimonial Evidence
Certain types of examination or inspection of the accused's body are
outside the scope of the privilege where such evidence is a means of
identification only and is non-testimonial in nature. As Justice Holmes
stated, "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal case to be
a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." 9 The privilege has no ap-
plication to such physical evidential circumstances as may be disclosed
by an open exhibition of the accused's body or by the ordinary obser-
vation of his person.10
Thus, in a police line-up where suspects are usually compelled to
talk and give certain information about themselves, though such pro-
cedure may be for identifying the voice as well as physical features, it is
not a violation of the privilege." Forcibly taking shoes from the accused
for comparison purposes does not violate his privilege, 12 nor does com-
6 Id. at 193. J. Wigmore, on Evidence § 2263 (3rd ed. 1940). Wigmore appears con-
vinced that the privilege was limited to testimonial disclosures.
T Weintraub, op. cit. supra note 1, at 506-7.
8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6.
9 Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910).
10 State v. Roy, 220 La. 1017, 58 So.2d 323 (1952); Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39
A.2d 821, 171 A.L.R. 1138 (1944).
11 J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence 206 (1961); Tucker v. U.S., 214 F.2d
713 (9th Cir. 1954); People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. App. 2d 223, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384
P.2d 16, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1963). Contra, when suspect had to repeat cer-
tain words which the rapist had spoken, State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289
(1948).
12 Potter v. State, 92 Ala. 37, 9 So. 402 (1891); State v. Papitsas, 80 N.J. Super. 420,
194 A.2d 8 (1963); People v. Van Wormer, 175 N.Y. 188, 67 N.E. 299 (1903); Payne v.
State, 239 P.2d 801 (1952). Contra, State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924),
where sheriff tried to force accused to put foot in a print, and accused responded




pelling the suspect to execute a writing exemplar.1 On a bill of divorce
alleging impotency, the party must submit to inspection to ascertain the
existence of impotency.14 Results of a drunkometer test do not violate
the privilege even though the specimen of breath had been forcibly taken
over the defendant's objection, since the privilege is directed primarily
against testimonial compulsion-that is, an admission of his own guilt
from his own lips. 15 Similarly, emetics have been administered forcibly
to cause vomiting for the purpose of recovering narcotics for use as evi-
dence.' 6 All of these cases involved the forceful taking of evidence which
was held not to be in violation of the privilege, since the evidence ob-
tained was not a testimonial admission from the accused. The evidence
was a physical, tangible substance or matter rather than a conveyance
from the mind of the accused.
Examples where the privilege was found not to be violated, and
where the accused was compelled to submit himself for identification
purposes in the courtroom during a trial, include standing up 7 or as-
suming any desired position or posture,18 removing hair or beard,19 or
clothing,20 putting on a mask,21 exhibiting forearm 22 or hands, 23 trying
on a blouse 24 and moving feet into view of the jury.25 Pretrial evidence
can be taken without the consent of the accused for purposes of identifi-
cation of fingerprints, 26 measurements,27 photographs, 28 examination of
13 People v. Whitaker, 127 Cal. App. 370, 15 P.2d 883 (1932); State v. Renner, 34 N.M.
154, 279 P. 66 (1929); State v. Vroman, 45 S.D. 465, 188 N.W. 746 (1922); State v.
Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). See also, U.S. v. Mullany, 32 F. 370 (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1887); and Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157, 43 P. 1013 (1896), where on cross-
examination it was held that accused had waived his privilege by taking the stand.
Contra, State v. Scott, 63 Ore. 444, 128 P. 441 (1912) and Kennison v. State, 97 Tex.
Crim. 154, 260 S.W. 174 (1924) held as a confession and, therefore, inadmissible.
14 Anonymous, 89 Ala. 291, 7 So. 100 (1890).
15 State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d
110 (1965).
16 Lane v. U.S., 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 96
L. Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952), where a stomach pump was used to salvage capsules
of morphine. This was held to violate due process (shocked the conscience and ap-
proached the rack and screw) but not the self-incrimination privilege.
17 Roberson v .U.S., 282 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 879 (1960);
U.S. v. Socrentino, 78 F. Supp. 425 (D.C.M.D., Penna. 1948); State v. Fries, 246 Wis.
521, 17 N.W.2d 578 (1945).
18 Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959).
19 People v. Strauss, 174 Misc. 881, 22 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1940).
20 People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894).
21 Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 300 P.2d 545 (1956).
22 State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879).
23 Reid v. Middleton, 141 Miss. 324, 130 So.2d 554 (1961).
24 Holt v. U.S., supra note 9.
25 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
26 U.S. v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2nd Cir. 1932).
27 U.S. v. Cross, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 365 (1892).
28 Shaffer v. U.S., 24 App. D.C. 417 (1904).
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the body 29 including private parts,30 voice,31 dyeing a defendant's hair,32
examination of a suspect by physician for insanity3 3 and blood.
3 4
Some courts have held that certain forms of evidence for identifi-
cation are not admissible when given by the accused against his objec-
tions, and no court has held that a lie detector may be used on the
accused without his consent and such evidence thereafter admitted.
35
Generally, courts allow such evidence where it is for purposes of com-
parison or identification, whether it was obtained voluntarily or other-
wise.
With the advent of technology in the war against crime, the in-
creased use of mechanical evidence and the inability of defense counsel
to cross-examine a machine or laboratory test tube has caused concern.
The argument that such evidence is hearsay, because it constitutes an
unsworn mechanical witness not subject to cross-examination, has been
rejected.3 6 The rejection of this proposition is sound in that such evi-
dence must be evaluated and interpreted for the court by an expert wit-
ness who is subject to cross-examination. Further, the conclusions of an
expert witness are subject to final consideration and evaluation by the
jury. Courts have generally admitted mechanical evidence on speed de-
tection by electronic radar,37 comparison of blood types,35 scientific bal-
listics for identifying firearms,39 X-ray pictures,40 medical testimony on
electroencephalographs, 41 Harger Drunkometer test,42 motion or still pic-
29 Wigmore, supra note 6, at § 2220; U.S. v. Hung Chang, 134 F. 19 (6th Cir. 1904);
McFarland v. U.S., 150 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156
So.2d 368 (1S63); in re Stone's Estate, 77 Idaho 63, 286 P.2d 329 (1955); Lawhead v.
State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 P. 376 (1924).
30 Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10 S.W.2d 370 (1928).
31 Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 272, 162 S.W.2d 706 (1942).
32 Smith v. U.S., 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927, 71 S. Ct. 792
(1950).
33 Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1952).
34 Schmerber v. State, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966); State v. Alexander, 7 N.J.
585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951).
35 People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E.2d 336 (1946).
36 N.R.L.B. v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963).
37 State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. Super. 210, 100 A. 2d 778 (1953); City of East Cleveland v.
Ferrell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958); State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115
A.2d 35 (1955); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728 (1958). For a dis-
cussion of police radar and its related problems including the proper accuracy tests,
see W. McCarter, Legal Aspects of Police Radar, 16 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 455 (1967).
38 Kemp v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1950).
39 State v. Hadley, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 P. 458 (1923).
40 Howell v. George, 201 Miss. 703, 30 So.2d 603 (1947); Gindin v. Baron, 16 N.J.
Super. 1, 83 A.2d 790 (1951).
41 Melford v. Gaus and Brown Construction Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 151 N.E.2d 128
(1958).




tures, 43 finger, palm and footprints,4 4 specimens of hair,4 5 shoe, 46 tire,4 7
and tread marks, 48 blood analysis, 49 urinanalysis,5 ° and breath tests. 51
A few jurisdictions have held that some scientific tests cannot be admit-
ted without the showing of a defendant's consent.
52
Some "tests" have been disparaged as evidence, for example, mental
comparison or mere juxtaposition made of a boot track without any
actual measurement. 53 More than one court has rejected certain scien-
tific methods because they amount to mechanical attacks on testimonial
evidence, or because there is a deep-rooted apprehension that such meth-
ods will lead to usurpation of the fact-finding function of the jury.54
A great majority of courts allow mechanical evidence, however, realiz-
ing that where human interpretations can be left to the accuracy of
mechanical solution, the accused receives a verdict uninfluenced by
individual predispositions. Also, while many scientific tests are con-
cerned with physical objects or conditions, certain mechanical methods
relate to an accused's mental state and have not been allowed in court.55
No appellate court has upheld the admission of findings of lie detectors,
the pathometer or polygraph tests, because such tests, in addition to
including the possibility of testimonial admissions, have not attained
scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining
truth or deception. 50 The results of narcoanalysis and the use of sodium
43 Considine v. U.S., 50 Cir. 272, 112 F. 342 (6th Cir. 1901); Millers' Nat. Ins. Co.,
Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1958); Rogers v. De-
troit, 289 Mich. 86, 286 N.W. 167 (1939); De Tunno v. Shull, 144 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio
App. 1956); Jones v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 519, 209 S.W.2d 613 (1948).
44 Murdock v. State, 68 Ala. 567 (1881); Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 P. 288, 16
A.L.R. 362 (1921); State v. Millmeier, 102 Iowa 692, 72 N.W. 275 (1897); McLain v.
State, 198 Miss. 831, 24 So.2d 15 (1945); Stacy v. State, 49 Okla. Crim. 154, 292 P.
885 (1930).
45 Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 252, 12 N.W. 369 (1882).
46 Whetston v. State, 31 Fla. 240, 12 So. 661 (1893).
47 Brady v. McQuown, 241 Iowa 34, 40 N.W.2d 25 (1949); Watson v. State, 141 Neb.
23, 2 N.W.2d 589 (1942).
48 State v. Lawellin, 125 Kan. 599, 264 P. 1035 (1928).
49 Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A.2d 289 (1948).
50 State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937).
51 State v. Wardlaw, 107 So.2d 179 (Fla. App. 1958).
52 Trammell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956).
53 Ennox v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 328, 94 S.W.2d 473 (1936).
54 J. Richardson, op. cit. supra note 11, 154-55.
55 Id. at 153.
56 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145 (1923); U.S. v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp.
278 (D.C. S.D. N.Y., 1959); People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950);
Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. App. 1957). While admitting the
results of such tests is reversible error, such tests may be used as a means of in-
terrogation and investigation, Davis v. State, 308 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Crim. 1957), or
may be admitted as evidence by stipulation by the parties, People v. Houser, 85 Cal.
App.2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); Commonwealth v. McKinley, 181 Pa. Super. 610, 123
A.2d 735 (1956).
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pentothal have not been generally recognized by the courts as reliable
and trustworthy and are not regarded as competent evidence.57 The
paraffin test, used to determine whether a firearm had been recently
fired, has not been accorded sufficient reliability to justify admission of
the results of such tests into evidence. 58 Although the Nalline test, used
to determine whether or not a person is under the influence of narcotics,
has not yet achieved general acceptance by the medical profession as a
whole, it has generally been approved as admissible evidence. 59
Machine Reliability
Certain mechanical methods have been allowed in evidence and
others have been deemed as unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible. The
question is: what standard of accuracy is necessary to get the evidence
on the record? Of course, there is no real standard or listing of elements
per se. The general rule is that when a scientific method or principle
produces accurate results from a well-recognized discovery or scientific
precept, and from which a deduction can be made-which must be estab-
lished as having attained general acceptance in the field to which it be-
longs-then the standard is met.60 For purposes of identification, a mark
which is common to two objects is admissible to show them as being
identical, providing the mark does not occur with so many objects in
human experience that chances of the two objects being identical are too
slight to be appreciable.61 This involves the mathematical theory of
probabilities, wherein the chance of two objects bearing the identical
combination of marks is so small as to be negligible, and which experi-
ence has confirmed. 62 The courts, therefore, will allow evidence from
scientific processes which are the work of educated men in their respec-
tive fields of technical experience.6 3 Not every innovation, however, will
be admissible. Courts will usually withhold such evidence at least until
the method has achieved acceptance by the scientific world. When shown
that to be reliable and accurate, it will be allowed into evidence.
In this connection the courts will allow evidence where the scientific
method is accurate and reliable and the witness so testifying is com-
petent. The major considerations needed to justify testimony based on
mechanical methods are the truthworthiness of the process or instrument
in general, correctness of the particular analysis or instrument, and a
57 Lindsey v. U.S., 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956); State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285
P.2d 612 (1955); People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. App.2d 336, 246 P. 2d 913 (1952); Hen-
derson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951).
58 Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 1388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959).
59 People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
60 Frye v. U.S., supra note 56.
61 J. Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, at 386.
62 Id. at 389.




qualified operator to be called as a witness to identify the instrument
and interpret the results.64 The expert witness would then testify that
the apparatus has been generally accepted as dependable, that it has been
constructed according to accepted procedures and is in good condition
and that he is qualified for its use by training and experience. 5 An
expert witness may testify not only to facts but also to his opinions and
conclusions drawn from the facts, and he must show that he is qualified
to speak from observation, study or actual experience. 6 It must be
shown, therefore, that the expert witness has possession of the required
qualifications, and the trial court is left to determine, completely and
without review, whether that witness possesses the qualifications
Recent Cases
The withdrawal of blood from an accused's body involves questions
of whether or not there has been a violation of the self-incrimination
privilege of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Consti-
tution, and whether the tests are reliable and accurate. With the tech-
nological advances of blood grouping, courts have allowed evidence re-
sulting from the withdrawal of blood from a person's body to disprove
paternity68 and to prove the identity of blood found at the murder
scene. 69 Such evidence secured by blood analysis is neither a confession
nor testimonial compulsion, but rather should be classified with scien-
tific tests for identification purposes along with the other physical char-
acteristics of the body. Thus, the analysis of blood taken from an un-
conscious suspect 70 or against the objections of a conscious suspect 7' has
been held admissible and not a violation of the privilege. As the Su-
preme Court said in Schmerber v. State,7 2 ". . . the privilege protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or other-
wise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature.. . ." This case involved the extraction of blood for analysis
where the driver of an automobile was suspected of being intoxicated.
It was held that such non-voluntary extraction did not violate the
driver's self-incrimination privilege.
64 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, at 190.
65 J. Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof, 45 (3rd ed. 1937).
66 Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N.Y. 398, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941); Dough-
erty v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527, 57 N.E. 757 (1900).
67 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, at 640.
68 Id. at 610; Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1950).
Contra, State v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955), where evidence was used
to show possibility of paternity.
69 State v. Alexander, supra note 34.
70 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408 (1957).
71 Schmerber v. State, supra note 34.
72 Id. at 1830.
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Another physical characteristic of the body is the voice, and courts
have held that the voice is a competent means of identification and,
therefore, has been held to be admissible as evidence in court. 73 The
mere statement by a witness as to the identity of a voice is not admissi-
ble,7 4 unless the witness can relate facts and circumstances so as to re-
veal its identity.75 Generally, the courts will allow judicial compulsion
requiring the accused to speak for voice identification, holding that it is
not a violation of the self-incrimination privilege. 76 In the continuous
series of cases ending with Miranda,77 the evidence which is prohibited
by the self-incrimination privilege as communicative or testimonial is
that knowledge of the crime which is only within the defendant's con-
trol, and if such knowledge was acquired by word or physical coercion.
It is now almost universally held that sound recordings are admissible
providing a proper foundation is laid for their admission.78 There has
been considerable attention given to the argument that such evidence is
hearsay, amounting to an unsworn mechanical witness not subject to
cross-examination. These arguments have been rejected.7 9
Sound Recordings
This paper does not cover the vast subject of mechanical or elec-
tronic eavesdropping, except to state the general rule that as long as the
circumstances attending the use or installation of the eavesdropping de-
vice do not involve such unlawfulness as to contravene the rule against
illegal obtention, evidence need not be excluded merely because it was
secured by means of mechanical or electronic eavesdropping. Placing
a recording device on a telephone receiver or recording by use of an
extension phone is not a violation, where the consent of one of the parties
has been obtained.80 Such rule is founded on the logical rationale that
73 State v. King, supra note 15; Fussell v. State, 93 Ga. 450, 21 S.E. 97 (1893); Lenoir
v. State, 197 Md. 495, 80 A.2d 3 (1951); People v. Sullivan, 290 Mich. 414, 287 N.W.
567 (1939); Bland v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 553, 89 S.W.2d 996 (1936).
74 Barber v. City Drug Store, 173 Iowa 651, 155 N.W. 992 (1916).
75 U.S. v. LoBue, 180 F. Supp. 955 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1960); U.S. v. Moia, 251 F.2d 255
(2nd Cir. 1958); Andrews v. U.S., 78 F.2d 274, 105 A.L.R. 322 (10th Cir. 1935); Mc-
Graw v. State, 34 Ala. App. 43, 36 So. 2d 559 (1948); People v. Lorraine, 28 Cal.
App. 2d 50, 81 P.2d 1004 (1938); Mayr v. Goldschmidt, 63 Cal. App. 381, 218 P. 621
(1923); Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. 706 (1907); Godair v. Ham. Nat. Bank, 225
Ill. 572, 80 N.E. 407 (1907); State v. Bassano, 67 N.J. Super. 526, 171 A.2d 108 (1961).
76 People v. Lopez, supra note 11. Also admissible where it was voluntary, Burg-
man v. U.S., 88 App. D.C. 184, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
838 (1951); Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1957).
77 Miranda v. State, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
78 U.S. v. Goldman, 118 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1941); Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 362
S.W.2d 494 (Ky. App. 1962); State v. Alleman, 218 La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83 (1951);
Thompson v. State, 298 P.2d 464 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
79 N.L.R.B. v. Tex-Tan, Inc., supra note 36.
80 Rathbun v. U.S., 355 U.S. 107, 2 L. Ed. 2d 134, 78 S. Ct. 161 (1957); People v.
Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960). Also, a tape recording of a conver-





such information could have been disclosed by the consenting party with-
out the electronic assistance, and a mechanical playback will have less
of a tendency to forget, misinterpret or commit error. Even where state
statutes forbid electronic eavesdropping to obtain evidence from tele-
phone communications, such statutes are held inapplicable where the
device was used with the knowledge and consent of one of the parties.8 '
Before sound recordings can be admitted into court, certain foun-
dations must be laid including a showing that: the device is capable of
taking testimony; the operator was competent to operate; the recording
is authentic and correct; there were no changes, additions or deletions;
and identification of the speakers.8 2 The recent use of a device for iden-
tifying a speaker's voice involves a machine called a voice graph or spec-
trograph which was developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. The
machine is based on the principle that no two voices are identical and
that a recording of a voice can be identified just as accurately as a per-
son's fingerprint.83 In the sound spectrograph, the sample of speech to be
analyzed is recorded on a loop of magnetic tape. The recording is then
played back many times as an analyzing band filter-by heterodyne
methods-advances through the speech band. The output of this filter
energizes an advancing stylus which writes on electrosensitive paper
mounted on a rotating drum. A spectrum is produced-line by line-
giving a three-dimensional display of energy versus frequency and
time.8 4 The visible speech is then read by the total configurations of the
patterns. Many of the subtleties of a sound that the naked ear cannot
perceive can be readily distinguished in visual pattern differences. This
ability to distinguish sounds has given the sound spectrograph useful
possibilities beyond the identification of the human voice.8 5
81 People v. Albert, 182 Cal. App. 2d 729, 6 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1960). For a discussion of
eavesdropping and wire-tapping see D. Hines, Fourth Amendment Limitations on
Eavesdropping and Wiretapping, 16 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 467 (1967).
82 Steve M. Solomon, Jr. Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207, 88 S.E.2d 167 (1955).
83 Time Magazine, June 23, 1967, Vol. 89, at 66, "Because the frequencies and
energy distribution of the human voice are determined by the size and coupling of
the nasal, throat and oral cavities and by the manner in which such person uses his
articulators (tongue, teeth, lips, soft palate and jaw muscles) . . . it is highly im-
probable that any two voices can be identical .... Whispering, muffling the voice,
change its pitch or even mimicking another voice will not alter the basic voice print
pattern."
84 H. Dudley, Fundamentals of Speech Synthesis (Bell Telephone Laboratories,
Monograph 2648, 1956) presented at Audio Engineering Society Convention, N.Y.,
October 12, 1955 and published in The Journal of the Audio Engineering Society,
Oct. 1955 Vol. 3, 170-85.
85 Bell Telephone Laboratories, News Release, August 31, 1966. It is useful in diag-
nosis of diseased hearts or malfunctioning jet engines, investigate noise to improve
soundproofing, provide better communications equipment, identify aircraft, ships or
submarines and allow the deaf to hear by reading another's voice pattern; Science
and Mechanics, October, 1967, Vol. 38, at 91-92, article on L. G. Kersta, Speech Re-
search Scientist with Bell Telephone Laboratories, and the spectrograph's brand new
(Continued on next page)
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968
17 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
Some jurisdictions would be reluctant to allow evidence involving
voice identification; others would not allow it if it were obtained invol-
untarily. These same jurisdictions allow fingerprints, even where com-
pulsed, as evidence; they fail to associate the two similar methods of
identification whereby the "print" obtained by each method is associated
with the body. Both require expert witnesses to arrive at a conclusion
on the final comparison. The machine used in transferring the spoken
word into visible material is merely a further aid to the court, and, if
accurate, is more reliable than an individual's naked ear. The reliability
of the spectrograph has been shown to be dependable and, when operated
in accordance with the previous stated requirements of all mechanical
evidence, leaves no doubt as to its accuracy.8 6
The machine provides the court with non-testimonial evidence which
does not abridge an individual's privilege against self-incrimination. No
person has the privilege of refusing to submit to an examination which
has the purpose of determining or recording his corporal features or
other characteristics for identification. In the McKenna case, where the
court in pre-trial proceedings ordered the defendant to submit to a tape
recording of his voice for purposes of comparing it by use of the spectro-
graph with a previous recording held by the prosecutor as the actual
voice of the extortioner,8 7 the results of such comparison should be ad-
missible as evidence in the final proceedings of the court. In this case the
accused was merely required to speak into the recording mechanism
without the necessity of repeating any certain words. Reading the
Gettysburg Address or Dear Abby column would be sufficient to obtain
the necessary voice recording.
(Continued from preceding page)
method of "fingerprinting" the human voice to be used as a positive identification
of telephone callers. Though not practical at present, the plan is to use the device
where a telephone subscriber has received threatening or "terror" calls as a means
of identifying the mysterious caller; Life Magazine, July 21, 1967, Vol. 63, at 56A-B,
spectrograph used to ascertain and locate a faulty vibration indicating a malfunc-
tion from the sound of a missile; a dentist can determine whether a patient's teeth
are meshing together correctly by the sounds from clicking teeth together; in Watts
riot, voice prints helped convict Edward King of arson (case now on appeal); during
the 1967 Israeli-Arab conflict, a tape was released by Israel of an alleged phone
conversation between Egypt's President Nasser and Jordan's King Hussein in which
they decided to blame their defeat on American and British intervention. The
voices on the tape were then interpreted by the voice graph, the resulting voice
prints were analyzed and by comparison to other speeches recorded previously by
the heads of state the identity of the voices wes 100% certain.
86 Op. cit. supra note 84; R. Potter, J. Steinberg, N. French, W. Koeing, H. Dunn, L.
Lacy, R. Riesz, L. Schott, H. Dudley, D. Gruenz, Jr., G. Kopp and H. Green, Tech-
nical Aspects of Visible Speech, presented before the Thirty-first Meeting of the
Acoustical Society of America, N.Y. (May, 1946), (Bell Telephone System Mono-
graph B-1415, 1957), and published in the Journal of the Acoustical Society of
America (July, 1946), Vol. 17, 1-89; S. Pruzansky and M. Mathews, Talker-
Recognition Procedure Based on Analysis of Variance, Journal Acoustical Society of
America (November, 1964), Vol. 36, 2041-47; A. Presti, High-Speed Sound Spectro-
graph, The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America (September, 1966), Vol. 40,
628-34.





The general rules which determine whether mechanical non-
testimonial evidence is admissible into court involve questions of
whether the material is competent and relevant, whether the machinery
is reliable and accurate, and whether the expert witness is qualified to
testify and interpret the results. Such evidence must then be weighed
by the jury or court. Unbridled admittance of all mechanical testimony
would obviously be too extreme, just as complete inadmissibility of any
mechanical testimony would be lacking in rationale and precedent.
In the future more advanced mechanical methods will be employed
to obtain evidence of every sort. When such instruments are accepted
in their field as accurate and reliable, the courts should not hesitate to
allow their results where it involves the identification aspect of a per-
son's physical appearance. As stated by the court in the McKenna case,
"American justice demands the state to carry the burden of producing
evidence sufficient to convict one it seeks to punish. But this burden
should not, however, be considered as limiting the state in its use of the
swift strides forward in the field of technology and science." 8s
88 Id. at 74, 226 A.2d at 760.
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